I. “Above all, a lie is in its way, a piece of evidence.” –Marc Bloch (1886-1944)
Several respected observers have remarked that the reasons given in public for the current mass demonstrations in Israel are not the real ones. Therefore, we must ask, what are the real reasons?
Former Prime Minister Ehud Barak, who has become the face of the opposition to judicial reform, has given several reasons for his challenge to the current coalition. Most are directed against Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. On several occasions, he has claimed that during the election campaign Netanyahu hid his plan of passing legislation for judicial reform, which effectively would result in a “regime change,” ending democracy in Israel and transforming it into a totalitarian dictatorship. Although the government was elected legally, he says, the new legislative program, — “a revolution from the top down,” — made it illegitimate. Therefore, it became imperative to resort to civil disobedience and topple the government. Not the least, Barak expressed his intention to make his mark on history.
Marc Bloch (1886-1944), the great French historian and author of The Historian”s Craft, explained that a forgery or a fraud can be used as a piece of evidence, that: “To establish the fact of a falsehood is not enough at all. It is further necessary to discover its motivations, if only as an aid to tracking it down. So long as there is any doubt about its origins, there is something in it which defies analysis and which is, therefore, only half proved. Above all, a lie is in its way, a piece of evidence.” Bloch added that it is necessary to seek out the man and to discover the motivation for the deception.
It is public knowledge that some retired generals, when they enter public life in Israel, dream of political accomplishments. A general”s job is to win. Some may be willing to pay a high price for victory on the battlefield and even accept heavy collateral damage as the price of political success.
We may give an example. From his own public statements, it is clear that Ehud Barak wants to make his mark in history. He was one of Israel”s most decorated soldiers, but Benjamin Netanyahu, despite serious setbacks, achieved the type of major political, economic, and diplomatic success in state-building that eluded Barak (who was his commander). One may gather from his own words that personal rivalry, green envy, and the desire to make his mark in history motivated this man.
On February 25, 2023, The Times of Israel reported Barak”s remarks to a conference in Tel Aviv of the Haaretz newspaper, the Zulat Institute, and the New Israel Fund. He declared that “historical experience has shown that when 3.5 percent of the population stubbornly persists in demonstrations and protests by all means at its disposal, the government either collapses or falls. I don”t know what damages will be caused along the way, but I am sure that we will win because we are on the right side of history, and we are not afraid of anything or anyone.” However, while one may learn from the experience of others, it is generally accepted that history is not an independent force and it does not teach lessons.
Furthermore, the Chatham House interview, entitled “In Conversation with Ehud Barak,” took place in late March 2023. Here, he repeated the claim that, when Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu”s coalition introduced legislation for judicial reform, [he was] attempting regime change [or “regime revolution”] “from the top down.” By doing so, they were acting legally but illegitimately, and therefore it became imperative to defend democracy and prevent Israel from becoming a totalitarian state by driving the coalition out of power, using unrelenting public demonstrations and civil disobedience. Barak revealed that he was following the tactics which Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan described in their monograph, Why Civil Resistance works: The strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict (New York, 2012). He was enamored particularly with its 3.5 percent formula.
Basically, Barak used the paranoiac myth with the purpose of creating a new reality in the public mind, namely, that if the opposition did not seize the initiative and go to the streets, the legally elected government would destroy democracy and bring about a dictatorship within weeks. This facile myth, based on specious premises, is easy to grasp and travels well. With repetition, even big lies gain credibility, and the media amplifies their impact.
II. “It’s like déjà vu all over again.”–Yogi Berra (1925-2015)
Going to the streets with the intention of toppling the government means crossing a red line, but it has happened before. Writing about the American student protesters in the 1960s, George F. Kennan, the respected political thinker and historian, (who, in 1946 was probably the first to describe the Cold War), objected to this approach. He observed that instead of challenging governmental policies, the protesters attacked the institutions of government:
“This difference between a change of structure and a change of policy&mdashbetween the institutions of government, on the one hand, and what I referred to as the “workings” of those institutions, on the other, seemed to escape them entirely. I can see in this only another manifestation of the dreadful confusion that prevails in their thinking about political institutions generally, and particularly of their tendency to view governments as some sort of force outside of society – as the master, rather than the product, of the political institutions by which the country lives.” Kennan observed that the demonstrations reflected “&hellipsome inner distress and discontent with contemporary society,” which found expression in a “changing focus of student concern,” because the demonstrators were seeking new issues to advocate. From the letters he received, he also noted a “lack of humor and of any joie de vivre.”
Kennan”s observations are relevant because they describe a pattern of political behavior in Israel. In fact, the present campaign against the legally elected government is not new. In the late summer of 2012, a group of prominent Israeli intellectuals, politicians, influencers, and fashionable authors accused the Prime Minister of the time (who happened to be Benjamin Netanyahu) of being a dictator, a megalomaniac and war criminal. Moreover, they claimed that the existing form of government was not a real democracy. According to them, the prime minister, the government, and the idea of the Jewish State lacked virtue.
While our natural inclination is to regard the crises of 2012 and 2023 as separate, there is a continuity of players and ideology, and it is more than likely that both belong to an underlying counterculture. To use the expression of Yogi Berra (1925-2015), “It’s like déjà vu all over again.” A well-organized and well-funded opposition is so determined to achieve its objectives that it is even prepared to endanger the existence of the State.
On August 17, 2012, the author described this campaign in an Op-ed, “From Delegitimation to Insurrection,” in the nationally circulated Hebrew weekly, Makor Rishon. He wrote that this aggressive and confrontational form of delegitimization exceeded the bounds of civil discourse. In social-science terms, these adversaries rejected the basic paradigm of the State of Israel, its social and political fabric, its legal system and, in its most basic sense, its unwritten constitution.
We must take the message of these individuals seriously and direct our attention to their real objective, — which they have openly stated. They did not offer constructive criticism. They did not seek to convince, but to seize power. They knew that they could never be elected through fair and free elections, so they endeavored to gain power by “other means.”
III. “The Patient but deadly Struggle”
At present, the important questions which historian Marc Bloch posed can be answered only partially. Can we identify the man and his motives? We cannot answer this question with absolute certainty, but we can offer a common-sense answer. Former Prime Minister Ehud Barak became the public face of the protest movement and declared that its goal was to topple the government. As noted above, he spoke of the damage that his approach would cause “down the road,” whatever the cost. This would imply that he and his allies are prepared to accept a considerable level of violence and collateral damage.
The “Resistance” has been using a unified doctrine of warfare which combines both political and military initiatives. According to this doctrine, the political conflict takes precedence over the military, and its preferred methods are the delegitimation of an adversary and the decomposition of its society. In this context, the means reveal the ends, and one can reason by deduction that the choice of tactics, namely those of political warfare, reveals the ultimate goal of those who use them.
A campaign of delegitimation and decomposition at home and abroad has resulted in a self-inflicted assault on the goodwill and respect which the Jewish State earned over the years, aimed at harming the tourism industry, damaging its credit rating, degrading the “Start-up Nation” brand, and undermining the Israel-Diaspora relationship. The basic goal of decomposition is weakening and dividing free societies. It leads to demoralization, political paralysis, and, in the case of Israel, “disorganizing” the army, destruction of the cohesive force of mutual responsibility, collective strength, resilience, and national pride.
One key fact indicates that “decomposition” is a gravely serious matter. When pilots and members of Israel”s elite army reserve units even speak about refusing to serve, it is obvious that the country is already engaged in a political war. There can be no doubt that disrupting the apparatus for calling the reserves and organizing the pilots” petitions is an act of political warfare whose purpose is to weaken an enemy. In the light of the traditions from which this form of warfare originates, it is not a lawful act of protest. Its purpose is to weaken the defenses of the state and render it vulnerable.
Furthermore, during the past decade, the political and economic landscape has changed, which may be one of the objective causes for the crisis. Given the special conditions in Israel with the development of new industries and new opportunities, new concentrations of wealth and political influence have emerged, with corresponding levels of inequality. Israel has entered the era of the venture capitalists (VCs), of Initial Public Offerings, (IPOs) on the Nasdaq exchange, advanced water management, prospecting for natural gas, agricultural technology, design of advanced computer chips, rocket technology, artificial intelligence, and, of course, a central bank which has contributed to the country”s economic stability.
The Yugoslav political philosopher Milovan Djilas (1911-1995) first applied the term, the “New Class,” to the small minority that rules and administers a communist nation “&hellip. Djilas noted that because this minority controls the disposition and use of national resources, by the Roman definition of property it owns the State.” His definition need not apply only to a communist state, but can describe the emergence of a “New Class” in Israel and the emergence of a group of “knowledge workers,” with distinct political views. They are commonly referred to as the elite, but the term “New Class” is more comprehensive. In his time, former Chief of Staff of the IDF, Moshe Yaalon spoke of Hon, Shilton, ve-Iton, a conglomerate of Wealth, Government, and Press. The process has continued. In short, Israel has grown a “New Class” which has convinced itself that it owns the state.
This development has changed the political reality in Israel and created a major opportunity, an invitation, for those who would seek to exploit the existing divisions in society and cultivate disunity. Hence, we must discuss the tactics of political warfare and particularly the use of decomposition, a non-military form of warfare. The methods of decomposition have become so universalized that many forget their origins.
George F. Kennan, who served as the Chargé d”affaires at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, described in his famous “Long Telegram” of February 22, 1946 the onset of the Cold War and its roots in Russian political culture He analyzed the Russian world view in the context of its historical-geopolitical and military traditions. Kennan explained that “they [the Soviets] have learned to seek security only in patient but deadly struggle for total destruction of rival power, never in compacts and compromises with it.” He observed that according to the Russian and Soviet traditions peace was not considered the normal state of affairs but rather a condition of prolonged conflict. Thus, he outlined the “Basic Features of Post-War Soviet Outlook:”
The heading of part 4 of his telegram dealt with methods of subterfuge: “[The]Following May Be Said as to What We May Expect by Way of Implementation of Basic Soviet Policies on Unofficial, or Subterranean Plane, i.e., on Plane for Which Soviet Government Accepts no Responsibility”
We can easily recognize Kennan”s description of decomposition, although he did not designate it as such:
“To undermine general political and strategic potential of major Western powers. Efforts will be made in such countries to disrupt national self-confidence, to hamstring measures of national defense, to increase social and industrial unrest, to stimulate all forms of disunity. All persons with grievances, whether economic or racial, will be urged to seek redress not in mediation and compromise, but in defiant violent struggle for destruction of other elements of society. Here poor will be set against rich, black against white, young against old, newcomers against established residents, etc.”
Near the conclusion of the Long Telegram, Kennan admonished that we must study and understand in depth the Russian tactics of war in order to deal with them.
&hellip. (1) Our first step must be to apprehend, and recognize for what it is, the nature of the movement with which we are dealing. We must study it with same courage, detachment, objectivity, and same determination not to be emotionally provoked or unseated by it, with which a doctor studies an unruly and unreasonable individual.
IV. Decomposition and the Political War against Israel
We may better understand the type of warfare with which we are dealing if we follow George F. Kennan”s practical advice. Accordingly, we must devote careful attention to the method of non-military warfare known as “decomposition,” which has roots in Russia and the ancient traditions of Asia.
Although it was developed in Russia, it can easily be applied in other regions and countries. A student of this subject was Włodzimierz Bączkowski, a Polish army counter-intelligence officer who spent most of World War II in Mandatory Palestine and published the monograph, Towards an Understanding of Russia (1947) which describes and traces the evolution of Russian traditions of warfare. According to Bączkowski, “Russia, a country with a political culture much closer to Asian than European traditions, became an even more invasive and sinister empire under communist rule.”
He explained that demoralizing the enemy and destroying the cohesiveness of its society was a principle of Asian warfare which officers of the Imperial Russian Army studied in the nineteenth century. After the Revolution, the new Red Army adopted this doctrine. Bączkowski cited the study of Lieutenant General of the General Staff Mikhail Ignatievich Ivanin (1801-1874), On the military art of conquering the Mongol-Tatars and Central Asian peoples under Genghis Khan and Tamerlane (St. Petersburg, Second Edition, 1875). It was published by the military-scientific committee of the General Staff, of which he was a member. He cited “an unknown Chinese military writer” who explained the tactics of defense against the enemy:
Disorganize everything that is good in the enemy”s country, try to entangle representatives of the highest spheres in criminal undertakings, compromising their position and afterwards, according to opportunity, give publicity to their transgressions. Enter into contact with the lowest and most objectionable individuals in your enemy”s country. Hamper the activities of the government of the country. Propagate disagreement and dissatisfaction among the citizens. Instigate the young against the old&hellip. You should keep spies everywhere&hellip.
In this tradition, Boris Mikhaylovich Shaposhnikov (1882-1945), Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces and Marshall of the Soviet Union, wrote that the Russian army is a secondary type of Russian power. He explained that the Russian army”s “lack of success” in Poland in 1920 resulted from the fact that “the core of the question is in the preparation that should precede the war and from which one can predict with almost one hundred per cent certainty what will be the result. The preparations that should precede the war and decide the result beforehand are espionage, uncovering the intentions of the enemy, subversive moves to destroy at the beginning the plans of the enemy and propaganda to weaken the national effort of the hostile country.”
The Red Marshal reiterated these views in his book, The Brain of the Army, Mozg Armii (Moscow: Voyenni Vestnik, 1927-1929). Here, “he lays great stress on preparation in the enemy”s rear, so as to demoralize him as completely as possible from within. In his opinion, the adversary should, in principle be defeated before the armed forces are used against him. The troops attack the already much-cracked building. One of the ways to prepare the enemy”s defeat is to penetrate the governing centres of the adversary”s army and destroy them by propaganda. The regular army can then, with one hard blow, attain the expected results and gain sudden victory.”
From this point of view, “The Russian Army is rather the rear guard of the real defensive action of the State [author”s bold], action conducted by means of espionage, subversion and propaganda, and secret diplomacy aiming at rotting the enemy”s strength. Only after these activities does the Russian Army appear, with a far more modest part to play.”
According to Wikipedia, “Mozg Armii was very well received and had a lasting influence. Mozg Armii was quoted as an important text by nearly all Soviet military theorists and military historians. As late as the 1990s, it was still included as a textbook in the curriculum of the General Staff Academy. Thus, Mozg Armii can be seen as a landmark in Soviet military theory and doctrine on the organization of the Red Army’s General Staff.” It should be noted that both Generals Ivanin and Shaposhnikov were members of the General Staff: the first, of the Imperial Russian Army and the second, of the Red Army.
Stefan [Steve] T. Possony (1913-1995) was a little-known but highly important American strategist. During the early 1950s, when he was a professor of International Politics at Georgetown University, he studied methods of Soviet warfare and published, A Century of Conflict Communist Techniques of World Revolution. One of his subchapters dealt with the “rules of offensive action.”
According to Possony, “COMMUNISTS “do not play with revolution or war.” They rely neither upon violence nor war alone. Offensive military action is to be undertaken only if conditions and the concurrent employment of non-military weapons make success highly probable and significant.” He elaborated:
One of the most effective and least risky types of offensive action is to take advantage of conflicts in the enemy camp. If anticommunist powers fight each other, communist strength will increase relatively. If the communists can put the burden of creating revolutionary situations on enemy soldiers, so much the better.
Since it is impossible to anticipate the results of military action, infiltration must be practiced on maximal scale. By having agents in non-communist organizations, the soviets may be able to steer developments according to their intentions and interests.
Offensive action may or may not be successful. If it fails, communists should not be discouraged but should try and try again. If it works, communists should not get dizzy with success. New offensives remain to be launched.
Possony further developed his analysis in his essay, “Communist Psychological Warfare,” which he published in Orbis in 1957. One of his themes sums up the essence of decomposition: “in short, the Communists try to destroy what could be called the integrating elements of society.”
Possony summed up the unifying theme behind these principles, particularly within the Cold War context: “The recipe is simple: fears, guilt neuroses, lack of will power, and disoriented minds for the democracies, and fearlessness and resoluteness for a Communist elite acting with firm discipline and according to one doctrine.”
The doctrine of decomposition has persisted well into the twentieth century. An American researcher of Communist methods, Eugene Methvin, reported that “in the late 1950s [1959] the KGB added to its First Chief Directorate, responsible for espionage, subversion, and deception abroad, a new division called Section D&mdashfor “Disinformation and Deception.”
In addition, the well-known 1984 interview of KGB defector, Yuri Alexandrovich Bezmenov, described the methods of “ideological subversion” and particularly the high priority with which it received. He disclosed that 85 percent of the KGB”s work was devoted to “a slow process which we call either ideological subversion, active measures, or psychological warfare.” These statements give us a sense of proportion, particularly the crucial importance of political warfare as a component of Russian/Communist traditions of warfare.
Marshal Shaposhnikov meant what he said: “The Russian Army is rather the rear guard of the real defensive action of the State [author”s bold], action conducted by means of espionage, subversion and propaganda, and secret diplomacy aiming at rotting the enemy”s strength.” If there is a single finding that these thinkers impart, it is the great priority which they attached to the achievement of political goals, which would then be followed-up by military warfare.
Decomposition is the first step, which means that for the present, maintaining the strength of the home front and the rule of law is a matter of vital importance for Israel”s security.
V. Postscript
“You ignore the psychological factor. This war will be settled in the rear and not in the trenches.” V. I. Lenin, March 1918
In August 1915, Vladimir Ilyitch Lenin (1870-1924) wrote that those who want revolution must work for the defeat of their own country. When he wrote, he thought that the first uprising of the workers would break out in Imperial Germany, but he was mistaken. Nevertheless, the idea is clear:
&hellip. A “revolutionary struggle against the war” is an empty and meaningless exclamation&hellip unless it means revolutionary action against one”s own government even in time of war. One has only to think a little to understand this. And revolutionary action in wartime against one”s own government undoubtedly and incontrovertibly means not only desiring its defeat, but really facilitating such defeat&hellip.
In early March 1918, Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart, the British consul in Moscow, met with Lenin and described his personal impression: “&hellip. In his creed of world-revolution Lenin was as unscrupulous and as uncompromising as a Jesuit, and in his code of political ethics the end to be obtained justified the employment of any weapon. He gave me, — correctly as events proved&mdashall the information for which I asked&hellip.
Lockhart asked Lenin about the possible outcome of the Great War, because, at that moment, it appeared that the German Imperial Army had gained the advantage. He then described Lenin”s reply:
“Lenin smiled. Like all your countrymen you are thinking in concrete military terms. You ignore the psychological factor. This war will be settled in the rear and not in the trenches.”
Later, on October 10, 1918, Lenin wrote that it was necessary to “disorganize” the army: “Not a single great revolution has ever refrained from “disorganizing” the army and cannot refrain from doing so&hellip.”
Conclusion:
Based on the open sources at our disposal, we may identify the motives and the methods driving today”s political warfare in Israel. It cannot be ruled out that the ultimate goals of the “Resistance” are civil war, national defeat, and revolution. Although the Soviet Union has passed into history, certain political agitators in Israel, while claiming moral superiority and acting in the name of democracy (as they understand it), have applied the Russian methods of decomposition.
Dr. Joel Fishman is a historian and Fellow of a research center in Jerusalem.
The article above is currently in press with the Journal of National Resilience, Politics and Society, Vol V, nos. 1-2 (2023).
